


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# For New CIA Chief, a Big Rebuilding Job



Carter with his CIA choice, Admiral Turner.

**A**S DIRECTOR of the Central Intelligence Agency, Adm. Stansfield Turner will face two stern challenges:

1. How to revive confidence in the CIA, which has been rocked by two years of charges and investigations.

2. How to weigh accurately the strategic balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union—and assess the Kremlin's intentions behind its recent build-up in strategic weaponry.

Turner also will probably be called upon to decide whether the CIA should be reorganized to separate its research and analytical functions from its secret "dirty tricks" operations.

The record of the 53-year-old naval officer has encouraged congressional and military leaders to predict that he will prove the right man for the job. Turner's confirmation is expected to move smoothly through the Senate.

President Carter's first choice for the CIA job, Theodore C. Sorensen, ran into such strong opposition in the Senate Intelligence Committee that he withdrew his name from consideration.

Moving carefully to avoid a second embarrassing rebuff, the White House notified congressional leaders of the Turner choice before making it public, and received favorable reactions.

**Fine record.** Turner will bring to his new task a long and impressive career as a naval officer and military analyst.

After graduating from the Naval Academy at Annapolis in the same class with Carter in 1946, Turner served briefly on a cruiser, then won a Rhodes Scholarship that led to a master's degree at Oxford University in 1950.

In the Korean War, he served aboard destroyers. In the Vietnam War, he commanded a guided-missile frigate. Between sea duties, he was a defense-systems analyst at the Pentagon. As president of the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., from 1972 to 1974, he shook up that school by toughening its courses and examinations.

Since 1975, Turner has been commander in chief of Allied forces in Southern Europe, with headquarters in Naples.

Turner will take over the CIA at a time when its credibility in sizing up the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance is under sharp attack.

A group of outside experts was

brought in last year to participate in what was described as a "competitive assessment" of the Soviet threat. The outsiders challenged the official position of CIA insiders who saw no grave danger, even though conceding that the Soviet arms build-up had gone further than earlier assessments had indicated.

The outsiders took a more alarmist view, and their assessments of the "worst case" danger were leaked to the press in a way that made it appear the CIA had been forced into a radical revision of its official estimate.

The debate centers not so much around actual capabilities of the Russians as it does about Soviet intentions. Key questions are: Is Moscow trying for strategic superiority over the U.S.? Have the Russians already achieved an edge, or at least a parity, that will make them bold enough to challenge the United States? And, in a crisis, would Russia be strong enough to force the U.S. to capitulate?

All this has brought into question the whole system of producing national intelligence estimates on which American policy is based.

A recent article by Turner is being studied for clues to his approach to the Soviet arms problem.

Writing in the January issue of the quarterly *Foreign Affairs*, Turner described the assessment of naval balance as "not just a numbers game." He suggested that the most useful way to compare the naval power of the U.S. and Russia is not to count ships, planes and submarines but to assess whether the American force is capable of carrying out the major missions it is assigned.

Turner also urged a study of "long-range trends," saying: "Focus on trends rather than statistics will make the dialogue on the naval balance more substantial and more constructive."

He warned that: "A miscalculation, especially in the area of sea control, could bring serious consequences. Our survival and that of our allies in war depend on the vital sea links between us, and these are insured largely by our naval power."

"The perception by allies, neutrals

and opponents of our will and capacity to control those sea lanes, if necessary, can tip the scales of political action in peacetime. Assessing the naval balance in sound terms thus directly touches our nation's safety."

It is this cool, pragmatic approach that Turner's backers expect him to take in assessing the over-all balance of military power between U.S. and Russia.

In making that assessment, the Admiral will be confronted with the question of whether a new method of intelligence analysis is needed. Some experts argue for a return to a system that Richard Nixon abolished: using an independent board to make "national intelligence estimates" without any pressures from inside the intelligence agencies.

There is no public record to indicate how Turner feels about the recent demands for closer control of CIA's covert operations or safeguards against such abuses as were uncovered by recent congressional investigations.

**The funnel.** As CIA Director, Turner will co-ordinate information reaching the President from all of this country's intelligence agencies, including the military.

At a time when the Pentagon and its growing budgets are subjects of controversy, some critics question the choice of a military man to head the CIA, whose estimates strongly influence military spending. Turner is the fourth military officer to be chosen for this job. By law, his deputy will be a civilian.

Although Carter and Turner were classmates at Annapolis, they did not know each other then, and have met only occasionally since. Turner ranked 25th in the graduating class, in which Carter—who as President is now Turner's boss—ranked 59th.